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From  the  Rainy  Place to  the  Burnt  Palace:  How  Social
Movements form their Political Strategies. The Case of the Six
Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba.
LEONIDAS OIKONOMAKIS
Durham, UK
How  do  social  movements  form  their  political  strategies?  The  relevant  theory  places
considerable  attention  on  structure,  and  argues  that  when  political  opportunities  are  open,
movements  are  more  likely  to  opt  for  a  systemic  political  strategy;  when  they  are  closed,
movements are expected to take a more revolutionary turn. However, political opportunities can
make  some options  appear  more  ‘realistic’ and  others  less  so–but movements  don’t  always
behave ‘realistically.’ They might explain when movements are more likely to mobilise and what
repertoires  they adopt  once they do so,  but they don’t  account  for what  happens earlier  on:
through what mechanisms the movements form their political strategies. Exploring the case of
the  cocaleros  of  the  Chapare,  this  article  argues  that  more  emphasis  should  be  placed  on
mechanisms that  are  internal  to  the movements,  such as:  a)  the resonance  of other  political
experiences  at  home and abroad,  b)  internal  struggles  for  ideological  hegemony,  and c)  the
political formation of their grass roots.  
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¡Guerrilla!
- ‘Compañeros, are you inclined towards a rebellion?’ I would ask them during the seminars.
- ‘Yeees! Armed struggle!’ Evo would shout. 
‘No’,  I  would  explain  .  ‘Ours  is  a  political  struggle  for  the  coca  leaf,  for  the  right  to
participate in the elections with our own candidates.’
Evo is Evo Morales, a cocalero (coca grower) leader opting for the via armada back then and today's
President  of Bolivia.  The excerpt  above is  part  of an interview the author  conducted with Filemón
Escóbar,  a  legendary figure of the Bolivian left,  Evo’s  mentor,  and  influential advisor  and political
instructor of the Seis Federaciones del Trópico de Cochabamba at the time. Las Seis Federaciones (the
Six  Federations  from  now  on)  were  the  coordinating  body  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  Chapare,  a
previously  de  facto semi-autonomous  region  where  the  coca  growers  administered  all  day-to-day
activities and disputes, and were practically independent from the Bolivian state.  They had only  one
obligation: to register the land that was under the administration of the Six Federations with the National
Agrarian Reform Service (Servicio Nacional de Reforma Agraria) and, of course, collect taxes on behalf
of the state. However,  in 1988, officially in an effort to regulate coca production in the country, the
Bolivian government  passed  a law (Ley 1008) that  criminalised most of the economic activity of the
Chapareños. It also tried to reclaim authority and sovereignty over the region, thus violating the  de
facto autonomy of  the  cocaleros.  And it  did  so  mainly  through  deploying  the  military  police:  the
UMOPAR (Unidad Mobil  para el  Patrullaje  Rural-  Mobile  Rural  Patrol  Unit), also  known in  the
Chapare as the  leopardos due to the color of their uniforms and the leopard badge they wear on their
arm. 
The  cocaleros responded  as  social  movements  usually do:  with protests,  road  blockades,
marches,  hunger  strikes,  sit-ins,  public  cultural  protest  events,  occupations  of  government  offices
(Healy,  1991: 90) and any other repertoire  of action they could employ.  To no avail.  According to
Salazar  Ortuño et  al.  (2008),  between 1980 and 2004 the  cocaleros of  the Chapare suffered  heavy
repression: 95  people–including 8  babies–were killed either by the army or the special  antidrug and
paramilitary forces, 446 were injured, 121 were tortured,  and 4134 were detained. The figures provided
by the office of the Chapare Human Rights Ombusdman are more modest:  they speak of 33 fatalities,
567 injuries, and 693  detainees between January 1997 and August 2003  (Ledebur, 2005:164). When
called to decide on how to react , the option of armed struggle was seriously considered, as the excerpt
from the interview with Don Filemón indicates.  After all,  was it  not Evo Morales himself who had
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actually  warned that  the  Chapare  would  become the  new Chiapas  at the  heart  of  South  America?
(Astelarra, 2014: 43) However, the civil war Evo warned about and the guerrilla he opted for never took
place, and he is now President of Bolivia. How did  it happen? Why did the cocaleros of the Chapare
reject the option of armed struggle and choose the parliamentary route to social change instead? And, in
broader terms, how and through what mechanisms do social  movements  decide  for certain political
strategies  and  reject  others?  This  article  is the product  of  four months of  political  ethnographic
fieldwork in the Chapare, including more than 20 semi-structured interviews. I focus on the case of the
cocaleros of the Chapare and argue that if we want to understand the mechanisms through which  social
movements opt for certain political  strategies and reject  others, we should focus on certain internal
processes. These include: a) the role of intellectuals within the movements and their internal struggle for
ideological  hegemony,  b) the study of  previous  political  experiences,  contemporary  or historical,  at
home and abroad, and c) a long political formation of the grass roots that ensures the discipline of the
movement’s militants.  
Political Strategies and Social Movements
Considering the repressive situation  facing  the cocaleros in the late 1980s-early 1990s, any political
scientist familiar with the political opportunities structure–the dominant explanatory theory in the field
when it comes to social movement strategies–would have believed that guerrilla warfare would be their
strategy of choice. Their relative autonomy had been violated, their main source of livelihood was under
threat, and their protests were violently repressed. In addition, their remote, unwelcoming jungle region
would  be  the  ideal  location  for  a  guerrilla  war.  They  were  even  already  organised  in  unions  and
federations, and could count on the militant experience of hundreds of ex-tin miners who had arrived in
the region looking for a better life and were determined not to lose their main source of income for the
second  time,  as  we  will  see  later  on  in  this  article.  However,  against  all–academic  or  activist–
predictions, the cocaleros of the Chapare opted for a different, more reformist, strategy: that of forming
a political party and competing in the elections, first for local and then for state power. In what follows,
I will try to analyse how that happened. But before doing so, I will elaborate on what the relevant theory
suggests with regards to the political strategies of movements and how they are formed.
Goodwin  (2001: 10) defines movements that ‘advance exclusive, competing claim to control of
the  state  or  some  segment  of  it’ as  revolutionary  social  movements,  or–simply put–revolutionary
movements.  He draws his definition from Tilly’s ( 1994: 134) definition of  revolutionary situations
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which are characterised , among other things, by the appearance of such contenders or coalitions of
contenders. This article argues that, while the concept of revolutionary social movements is useful in
defining movements that target the control of the state or a segment of it, at the same time it can be
confusing  because  those movements  do  not  always  have  a  revolutionary  character,  in  the  sense  of
changing the  regime  through revolutionary  means  or of  implementing  revolutionary,  radical,  social
transformations within a given territory. The ‘revolutionary route’, as I call it, is just one of the strategic
options available to movements and not the only one. 
Social movements,  have two options to choose from when it comes to their political strategies:
Those that aim at state-power  (Petras and Veltmeyer,  2005; Petras and Veltmeyer,  2009; Petras and
Veltmeyer, 2011), and those that aim at emancipation (Holloway, 2002; Holloway, 2010). The former
refer  to  gaining control  over  the  state  apparatus,  ‘the  set  of  organisations  involved in  making and
implementing binding collective decisions, if necessary by force.’ (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992:6) That
can be achieved either through participating in the elections and playing by the rules that have been set
up by the state itself  regarding the change  of leadership (the parliamentary route),  or through more
revolutionary means: the taking of state/regional power in an ‘irregular, extra-constituent, and/or violent
fashion’ (Goodwin, 2001:8). Now, if a social movement decides to opt for the non-state power road, that
usually involves more prefigurative politics that revolve around autonomy and the construction of new
institutional structures,  and  not just  the  taking of already existing ones  (Holloway, 2002; Holloway,
2010; Zibechi, 2010; Zibechi, 2012; Dinerstein, 2014).  
Deborah Yashar (2005) and Eduardo Silva (2009) have studied the social movements that led the
cycles of protest  of the last fifteen years  in Latin America and brought several so-called progressive
governments  to power (Ecuador, Bolivia Argentina, Venezuela).  They argue that all mentioned cases
involved an opening of the political system and a rather reformist tendency that focused on electoral
politics. Guillermo Trejo (2012), who focuses on Mexico, agrees that in an open political environment it
is more probable for movements to opt for reformist political strategies, while more repressive regimes
are more likely to cause more violent counter-reactions. These are important contributions that are in
line with the Political Opportunities Structure (Tarrow, 1994; Kriesi, 2004; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004;
McAdam,  Tarrow,  and  Tilly,  2001)  and  do,  in  fact,  offer  plausible  explanations  for  the  timing of
mobilisation in the aforementioned countries, as well as the form it took. However, they do not explain
the mechanisms through which the actual political strategies of the movements were formed, the options
they considered, and why ones were preferred over others. 
 However,  the  choice  of  a  specific  political  strategy is  not  necessarily  an  instinctive,  quasi
spontaneous reaction to external stimuli. In the case studied  here, at least, it involved: a) an in-depth
study of similar experiences, contemporary or historical, at home and abroad; b) an internal battle for
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hegemony between the movement’s intellectuals, and c) a long preparation of their grass roots, ensuring
their discipline. 
The rainy place
The Incas used to call it  Ancha Para, ‘the place where it rains a lot’.   Despite being located at the
geographical heart of Bolivia,  El Chapare  has always been a place of difficult access because of its
dense  tropical  vegetation  and  lack  of  infrastructure.  Administratively,  it  is  part  of  the  Tropic  of
Cochabamba which is comprised of the tropical  zones of Carrasco,  Chapare,  and Tiraque,  and was
colonised rather late by the Bolivian state. The forced labor performed by the Paraguayan prisoners of
the War of Chaco, a war fought between Bolivia and Paraguay between 1932-1935 over the control of
the region of Chaco (Spedding, 2005; Albro, 2005; Grisaffi, 2013; Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2008), completed
the road that would connect the rest of the country with San Antonio (modern-day Villa Tunari) in 1938.
From that moment on, the two definitions of indigeneity and their bearers came into conflict  in the
Chapare:  indigeneity  in  relation  to  the  Bolivian  state  territory  (as  in  the  case  of  the  Aymaras  and
Quechuas that colonised the Chapare) and indigeneity in relation to time and to the territory of the
Chapare itself (as in the case of the Yuracaré and the Sirionó, who were indigenous to the Chapare when
the Aymaras and Quechuas came to colonise them). The issue is discussed in detail by Canessa (2014).
Migrants  of  diverse  sociopolitical  backgrounds  started  moving  to  the  region,  some  to  escape  the
haciendas of the lowlands and others simply in search of a better life that did not involve the tough
conditions of the mining industry. They grew subsistence crops such as yucca and bananas, while coca
was also produced in the region but could not be sold outside it  as the absence of a road network
hindered market access. 
                               
However,  the  colonisers  of  the  Chapare  did  not  arrive  to  an  empty  space:   the  region was
populated by the indigenous Yuracaré, Yuqui and Sirionó, treated by their fellow indigenous Aymaras
and Quechuas who migrated  there  as  colonised  populations.  To do justice  to  the Yuracaré  and the
Sirionó, I use the term ‘colonisers’ instead of ‘settlers’ for the people who moved to the Chapare from
the 1920s onwards. Years later,  ex-leader  of the Chimoré Federation Julio Suzaño would narrate  to
Sandra Ramos Salazar : 
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There were  the natives, as well as a spontaneous colonisation: (…) in what is Chimoré here,
there was only a community of miners from Catavi that came here in ’47 or ’57 I think,
right? They were very happy when we arrived because finally they saw people like them,
because they were fighting against the natives, the  savages [barbaros  in the original text],
now this  ethnicity  has  been extinguished,  the  Sirionó,  many cows died,  they  also killed
savages,  they  were  always taking,  stealing  and  very  few  [savages]  were  left…(Salazar,
2012:38) -author’s translation)
In the 1950s there was general confusion in Bolivia over the origins of the Yuqui people, considered by
some as being part of the Sirionó. Therefore, it is very possible that the interviewee in this excerpt is
actually mistaking the Yuqui for the Sirionó. As Canessa (2014:160) underlines, in the 1950s and 1960s
the citisens of Cochabamba lived in fear of those ‘wild Indians’.
On their  return to their  places of origin, the colonisers would recruit friends and relatives to
follow them in the quest for a better life in the Chapare. The Bolivian state promised more assistance
and some bridges were constructed in the late 1960s. Access to the main city and market of Villa Tunari
developed gradually  and the coca  leaf  found its  trading point,  becoming  the  only viable  economic
activity for the Chapareños. However, the state as an institution remained absent from the region and the
locals were forced to self-organise in an autonomous manner in order to meet their social needs. They
opted for the form of organisation they already knew from the Revolution of 1952 and some of them
from their  mining militancy even earlier:   the  sindicato (Union). The country's first  sindicatos were
formed by the Bolivian miners in the 1930s in an effort to  create an organised  resistance against the
local oligarchy–known as la rosca–that  controlled the tin industry. These unions, according to Postero
(2010, 20), gradually became the main form of political and economic resistance and gained a reputation
of independence from the ‘corrupt’ and ‘elite-controlled’ party (Stefanoni, cited in Postero, 2010). After
the 1952 Revolution, the Bolivian state encouraged the campesinos (farmers) to join the sindicatos, in
an effort to replace the previous land-owning structures, but also as a means of controlling and directing
them towards a ‘state-led transformative project’,  as Hesketh  (2014:  157) and  Dunkerely (1984:74)
argue.  However,  this  top-down effort  also  gave  birth  to  autonomous  or  semi-autonomous  projects,
especially in areas like the Chapare where the state had little or no presence. Ex-cocalero community-
leader Leonardo Marca from Chipiriri narrated to this author:
We were abandoned. The compañeros had to self-organise. Nothing can be done individually,
but when we are organised, yes we can. The organisation was doing things better than the
state. In the  sindicato they opened up streets with their own hands, they made their own
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schools. In the assembly, they evaluated their own living conditions. There were 10 or 15
members in the Directorate of the  Sindicato, there  is,  for example, a Secretary of Health
whose obligation  is  to check, if there are many sick people, whether there is a septic well,
because  sickness  derives  from  that.  Later  on,  from  ’86  onwards,  there  were  Health
promoters...  (Intervew with L.Marca)
From the very beginning, the sindicato became the main civil authority in the region administering the
de  facto autonomy  of  the  Chapareños  (Gutiérrez  Aguilar,  2008:  190;  Healy,  1991:  89).  It  was
responsible for parcelling the land, resolving local disputes, and administrating the emerging coca trade.
Affiliated members (afiliados)  were obliged to pay a monthly fee of 5 pesos and participate  in the
communal works (roads, bridges, schools, clinics). In addition, they had to comply with the decisions of
the  sindicato.  Thus,  as  Leonardo Marca narrates,  the  sindicato became the main  provider  of  social
services in the region, fully replacing the state in terms of authority and social provision. It also acted as
a communication channel between the state and the Chapareños, since–from the 1970s onwards–it was
responsible  for  the  registration  of  the land parcels  with  the  National  Agrarian  Reform Service,  tax
collection,  and  establishing transportation  fees  (Spedding,  2005;  Grisaffi,  2013;  Gutiérrez  Aguilar,
2008). To this day, these duties are still performed by the sindicatos in the Chapare (Grisaffi, 2013). A
number of sindicatos would form a central, a number of centrales a federation, and all Six federations
of  the  Chapare  were  coordinated  by  the  Coordinadora  de  las  Seis  Federaciones  del  Trópico  de
Cochabamba (Coordinating  Body  of  the  Six  Federations  of  the  Tropic;  from  here  onwards,  la
Coordinadora). The sindicato had a centralised structure and a predominantly male leadership (Farthing
and Kohl, 2010) at least until 1995 when the first female  sindicatos were formed. Therefore, in the
absence  of  state  structures,  the  sindicato  became  the  local  community  decision-making  body,  the
federation became the ‘municipality,’ and the Coordinadora of the Six Federations the ‘government.’ It
could be argued that the Chapare was like a ‘colony’ that maintained loose but rather regular relations
with the ‘metropolis’, managing to remain autonomous; however, it maintained its link to the metropolis
as a means of legitimisation, both outside and inside the domestic sphere. In fact, the sindicatos of the
Chapare  never broke their  ‘unofficial  pact’ with the state until  the state itself  violated their  relative
autonomy in 1988 with Law 1008. 
Law 1008 and the Miners
From the author’s point of view, two developments account for the radicalisation of the cocaleros of
the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba:
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a) Law 1008, which largely criminalised the region’s main economic activity, and
b) The massive arrival of miners  who had lost their jobs due to the closure of the tin mines after
1985.
In  1988,  the  government  of  Victor  Paz  Estenssoro  (MNR-Movimiento  Nacional  Revolucionario-
National Revolutionary Movement) approved Law 1008 (Ley del Régimen de la Coca y Sustancias
Controladas- Law of Regulation of Coca and Controlled Substances),  which is known as  la ley mil
ocho . It opened up ‘Pandora’s box for the country’s coca producers’ (Oikonomakis and Espinoza 2014).
Kathryn  Ledebur  argues  that  Law 1008  was  a  product  of  long-term pressure  exerted  by  the  U.S.
Embassy, and its passing was a prerequisite for the release of economic assistance to Bolivia, until then
withheld ( 2005: 151). In an effort  to regulate  coca production, from that moment on its cultivation
would be legal only in areas defined by the law as ‘traditional’; all others would be considered ‘illegal’.
‘Illegal’ zones were sub-divided into ‘zonas de producción excedentaria en transición’ (zones of surplus
production in transition), where  coca cultivation would be gradually replaced by other crops with the
assistance of the state, and ‘zonas de producción ilícita’ (zones of illicit production), where coca bushes
would be simply uprooted without any kind of compensation (Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2008). The Chapare
( with the exception of Yungas Vandiola) belonged to the last category, and Law 1008 practically marks
the breaking of the silent pact that the  cocaleros of the Chapare  and the Bolivian state had held until
then, according to which the sindicatos would maintain the order and pay taxes to the government and
the government would let them run their affairs autonomously. Of course, national and local elections
were  normally  conducted;  however,  elected  authorities  would  carefully  stay  away  from  the  harsh
conditions of the region and from challenging the authority of the  sindicatos. Feliciano Mamani, the
mayor of Villa Tunari in 2014, when the interview was conducted, remembers that the locals did not
even know what their ‘elected authorities’ looked like, as they would very rarely visit the region. From
1988 onwards, however, the state would have a face for the  Chapareños. And a uniform: that of the
leopardos.
The [only] presence the state had in the Chapare was in the form of the  leopardos, of the
police. Military police that fucked them over. And that was paid for by the gringos. Y punto!
(Interview with Raquel Gutiérrez) 
Law 1008 meant one thing for the majority of the Chapareños (except for those with property in
Yungas Vandiola): forced erradication. The reference to the  gringos has to do with the fact that–
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according to the  cocaleros–the war on drugs in the Chapare was led by the DEA, the U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration.
More or less in the same period, another process of crucial importance for the later developments
in the Chapare was taking place in Bolivia: the closure of the tin mines. Following the collapse of the tin
market, the backbone of the Bolivian economy at the time, the government invited Harvard professor
Jeffrey Sachs to act as its advisor. Despite the fact that he did not even know where Bolivia was on the
map, as he would later on admit, he came up with the infamous Decree 21060:
First,  the  October  1985  collapse  of  tin  prices  was  eating  away  at  the  budget  and
macroeconomic stability. The tin mines were no longer  profitable. The mining sector was
throwing the entire budget into a huge deficit. The Bolivians undertook a massive cutback on
the  tin-mining  labour  force,  one  that  was  shocking  in  scale  and  heartrending  for  those
affected. Almost five sixths of the tin workers eventually lost their jobs (Sachs, 2005:99). 
Among other structural adjustments, between 22.000 and 27.000 miners lost their jobs from the mines
that  the  Revolution  of  1952 had nationalised.  Ironically  enough,  the very same President  who had
previously nationalised the tin mines, Victor Paz Estenssoro, would now be the one to close them down.
Many of the miners moved to the Chapare and became cocaleros (Grisaffi, 2010; Albro, 2005; Dangl,
2007; Gutiérrez Aguilar, 2008; Spedding, 2005). And they were determined not to lose their livelihood
for the second time.
The Road to the Burnt Palace
After 1988 things became very difficult for the cocaleros of the Six Federations. Their relative
autonomy had been violated, their main livelihood was under threat, and their protests were met with
state repression which was particularly brutal during the 1985-1989 period as shown in table 1 (Table 1).
At the same time, a substantial number of ex-miners had moved to the Chapare, in some cases
collectively as entire unions. Ex-miner and veteran  cocalero leader Darío Mendoza remembers that,
when trying to  find a  name for  their  federation  (now called  Mamore/Bulo  Bulo),  the  second most
popular  proposal  was  Sangre  Minera,  Miner’s  Blood  (Oikonomakis  and  Espinoza,  2014:  293,
Oikonomakis, 2019:154). The Chapare was in turmoil, the Six Federations had to decide what to do, and
the option of guerrilla warfare was  popular among cocaleros and miners alike. I am not arguing  that the
guerrilla was the most popular option at the time, nor do we know the exact grand plan that the guerrilla
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represented: we don’t know whether it was supposed to be limited within the territory of the Chapare, or
whether it was envisioned as a wider revolutionary experience. We do know, however, that the idea was
on the table, even if loosely conceptualised. Don Filemón Escóbar  writes in his book De la Revolucion
al Pachakuti: el aprendizaje del aspecto reciproco entre blancos e indianos:
  
…the concept of the guerrilla was very popular with the cocaleros, young, mature, or old.
They were all trained to fabricate  caza bobos [artisanal grenades] including of course the
women.  (2008:179)
Furthermore,  they  had  already  formed  self-defense  committees  (comités  de  autodefensa)  and  were
feeling inspired by the Cuban revolution as well as by Zapatismo. Don Dario Mendoza continues: 
We were thinking of organising ourselves like in Cuba, armed struggle, and we would get
together  in  every  sindicato and  we would  plan  (the  armed  struggle).  (interview with  F.
Mamani)
Don Feliciano Mamani adds that there were also ‘other national organisations’ who were in contact and
in agreement with the cocaleros regarding the via armada:
 We would see Zapatismo and we would say: Why not here in Bolivia? …We will revolt
ourselves  or  we will  revolt  at  the national  level.  We were already in contact  with other
[national] organisations, we would say: we have to crush power through the  via armada.
(Interview with F.Mamani)
Of course, it was practically impossible that the Bolivians had even heard of the Zapatistas before 1994.
However, Feliciano Mamani’s interview indicates that, even when the cocaleros of the Six Federation
had already formed their ‘political instrument’ (after 1995, that is) they had not completely abandoned
the  guerrilla option.  Furthermore,  it  is  not  clear  what  ‘other’  organisations  he  is  referring  to.
Nevertheless, we do know that members of the Ejército Guerrillero Túpac Katari were also involved in
the formation of the autodefensas (Linera and Gutiérrez Aguilar, 1999). Stewart Prest also argues–based
on interviews he conducted in the Chapare–that not only had the EGTP started training cells in the
Chapare in the late 80s-early 90s, but also that Evo Morales was informed and at least consented to their
presence there:
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Q: Did you have some connection with Don Evo at the time? 
CL: Yes, but only as a guarantee, I mean, he actually made contact with us. 
Q: Was there any discussion of a grand strategy? 
CL: Well, yes, at a very global level, that armed struggle ought to be initiated. Overall, in
general terms of armed struggle and the discussion of what work we had implemented, and
his acceptance [of that] on his part. Fundamentally [there was] endorsement, acceptance,
because without  that  acceptance  we could have been denounced immediately.  We would
definitely have had the coca compañeros against us, or they could have treated us as drug-
trafficking groups… they could have tipped an UMOPAR in that zone looking for narcos.
(Prest, 2015:189)
  
This is one side of the battle for ideological hegemony that was taking place in the Chapare at the time,
involving the cocaleros as well as other organisations and intellectuals of the wider Bolivian left: the
side of the via armada.  The other side, that of the via parlamentaria,  is represented more than
anyone by Don Filemón Escóbar,  El Viejo Filippo (Old Philip,  his pseudonym) of the Bolivian Left.
Filemón Escóbar, a veteran Trotskyist miner and unionist, arrived at the Chapare as a cultural advisor on
behalf of the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana-Bolivian Workers’ Central), the biggest Worker’s Union
in Bolivia,  and offered  his  services  to  the  cocaleros.  Between 1984 and 2004,  together  with  other
political  instructors  such as Alex Contreras,  Oscar Coca, and  David and Germán Choquehuanca,  he
organised  more  than  600  seminars  and  workshops  in  all  Six  Federations,  as  well  as  in  numerous
centrales and sindicatos of the Chapare. In his own words:
In the seminars, we emphasised that to continue to vote for the neoliberal parties was to vote
for  the  annihilation  of  our  mother  organisations.  Voting  for  the  neoliberals  was the  best
service we could do to imperialism, to the IMF, and to the World Bank 
[…] Our seminars were spread all over Bolivia. Our main work was to give seminars… We
turned concentrations into seminars for thousands of  compañeros. Through this consistent
and permanent  work we forged the  political  instrument.  (Escóbar,  2008: 191-2-  author’s
translation)
According  to  Pablo  Stefanoni  (2010,  147)  it  was  through  this  path  (the  influence  of  Escóbar  and
Choquehuanca) that the ethnic/culturalist discourse reached Evo Morales, who was until then influenced
more by the revolutionary syndicalist tradition of the ‘50s and whose worldview was restricted to the
campesino demands. 
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The  aim  of  the  seminars  was  to  persuade  the  Chapareños of  the  historical  importance  of
intervening in the elections and to overturn the guerrilla tendencies that were growing in the Trópico (F.
Escóbar, 2008: 187). To attain that goal, he would first have to a) discredit the historical examples used
by the promoters of armed struggle to appeal to the cocaleros, and b) find his own tangible examples of
electoral participation that would be, if not more, at least equally inspiring. To deter them from turning
to armed struggle, he would talk to them about two failed attempts at armed struggle that had taken
place in Bolivia in earlier times: that of Che in 1967, which had led to his death, and that of Teoponte,
who had aspired to  taking up the mantle  after  Che in  1970,  once  again without  much success.  To
persuade them in favor of his own preferred political strategy,  he spoke of the experience of the Bloque
Parlamentario Minero (Miner’s Parliamentary Block-BMP). 
The  BMP was  the  product  of  a  historic  decision  of  the  FSTMB  (Federacion  Sindical  de
Trabajadores Mineros, Syndical Federation of Miners), the biggest mining trade union in the country, to
participate in the elections of 1947 with its own ‘parliamentary brigade’. The miners of the BMP were
candidates under the alliance of two parties, the MNR (Movimiento Nacional Revolucionario, National
Revolutionary  Movement)  and  the  Troskyist  POR  (Partido  Obrero  Revolucionario,  Revolutionary
Labor Party), and managed to get twelve deputies and two senators elected, being particularly successful
in the cities of Oruro and Potosi. This was an enormous success, firstly because it took place in the
country's  two  major  economic  centers  at  the  time,  and  secondly  because  it  occured  before  the
introduction of universal suffrage in Bolivia, implemented after the 1952 Revolution. The idea was to
create a  dual power situation in which BMP deputies would facilitate grassroots pressure for change
through their  participation in the country’s governing institutions.  The BMP was short-lived:  it  was
expelled  from  Parliament  two  years  later.  However,  its  parliamentary  experience  persuaded  Don
Filemón that the road to social change could also pass through Parliament. It became a reference point in
his seminars in the Chapare 30 years later and he managed to persuade the cocaleros using the BPM as a
tangible example. It is interesting to note here that Juan Lechín also acted as a paid professional advisor
to the cocalero Federations in the late ‘80s -early ‘90s, according to Healy (1991: 101). He was one of
the BPM senators elected in 1947, winning more than 2000 votes in Oruro. . Years later, president of the
IPSP of the Federación Carrasco Tropical Hilarión Gonzales would tell Durand Ochoa :
First, we would no longer divide our votes among different parties. We would vote as one
unit. Second, we would not give our votes away. We would form our own party and vote for
ourselves. We would do what the miners had not been able to do. ( 2014: 160)
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In 1994, taking advantage of the Popular Participation Law (Kohl, 2003) that gave extended budgetary
and planning capacity to Bolivia’s local municipalities (20 percent of the national budget instead of the
previous  10  percent),  the  cocalero movement  went  on  to  co-found  the political  instrument  IPSP
(Instrumento Político por la Soberanía de los Pueblos,  Political Instrument for the Sovereignty of the
People) together with other organisations of the indigenous-campesino movement of Bolivia, as agreed
in the VI Congress of the CSUTCB (Confederación Sindical Única de Trabajadores Campesinos de
Bolivia,  United  Union Confederation of Peasant Workers of Bolivia). A year later,  in the Congress
‘Land, Territory and Political Instrument’ that took place–ironically enough–in Santa Cruz, stronghold
of  the  Bolivian  elites,  the  CSUTCB,  the  Federation  of  Peasant  Women  of  Bolivia  Bartolina  Sisa
(FNMCB-BS), the Syndical Confederation of Bolivian Colonisers (CSCB), and the Indigenous Central
of the Bolivian East (CIDOB) established the Asamblea de los Pueblos (People's Assembly,  ASP) that
would later on become the MAS-ISP. After Evo Morales  was appointed chairman of the Six Federations
in 1996, the cocalero part of the CSUTCB began to fight for the leadership of the political instrument,
and eventually won it, partly by virtue of its electoral success in the municipal and national elections of
1995 and 1997, especially in the Chapare.  In the 1995 municipal elections the ASP (under the banner of
the Izquierda Unida- IU) managed to get 10 mayors and 49 local councilors elected in Chapare, and in
the national  elections of 1997 it  obtained 16.5 percent of the vote in Cochabamba and elected four
deputies ,amongst which Evo Morales Ayma, with 70 percent of the votes in Chapare and Carrasco,
becoming the most voted deputy in the Congress. However, it should be noted that, according to Durand
Ochoa (2012, 161), the decision to create a political instrument had already been made by the CSUTCB
in 1992, long before the introduction of the Popular Participation Law.  Pablo Stefanoni (2010) also
emphasises the fact that the plan to create a political instrument was being discussed by the Bolivian
campesino movement at least since 1988.  And, as we have already seen in this article, Don Filemón
Escóbar and other political instructors had already been giving seminars in the Chapare in favour of the
creation of a political party since 1984 (F. Escóbar, 2008: 201). Another interesting question is why the
cocaleros decided to trust people like Filemón Escóbar regarding their political strategising.  It is my
opinion that this  occurred because Don Filemón, apart from being a well-respected and charismatic
intellectual of the Bolivian left, was also an ex-miner, like many of the cocaleros of the Chapare; he was
one of their own, and this granted him even greater legitimacy. And, at the end of the day, he was trusted
by the Coordinadora and by Evo Morales himself.  
In 2009 Moira Zuazo (2009) interviewed  85 MAS deputies and senators using a structured
questionnaire in order to trace back the birth of the MAS. A big number of those interviewed had joined
the MAS after its formation; however, a couple of the interviewees, including Wilber Flores Torres and
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Gustavo Torrico,  were involved in the creation of the political  instrument  from the moment it  was
conceived.  They trace  this  back to 1992,  that  is, before the  introduction  of  the  LPP.  What  is  also
surprising is that none of Zuazo’s interviewees identifies the LPP as the instigator behind the creation of
the political instrument, even though some of them identify it as ‘influential’ in their personal political
development.  Therefore,  our evidence  points  towards  the  fact  that  the  conception  of  the  political
instrument of the cocaleros (and the campesinos in general) was conceived long before the introduction
of LPP. 
Just like other revolutionary movements , the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba had
already  worked  significantly  on  the  ideological  preparation  of  their  constituencies  before taking
advantage of the political  opportunity that appeared in 1994. In fact,  it  could be argued that it  was
exactly  because  of  their  long  preparation  that  they  were  able  to  take  advantage  of  the  LPP in  a
meaningful, organised way and not in an instinctive, quasi opportunistic one.
However, it appears that many in the Chapare, including Evo Morales himself, saw the electoral
struggle as a tactic, not a strategy. ‘ Under the poncho we held the electoral card in one hand and the
fusil (gun) in the other’: this was the dominant idea among the cocaleros at the time, even after the first
electoral success of their political instrument, the ASP (Asamblea de los Pueblos), in 1995. Evo himself
was persuaded that, as they had not managed to stop the eradication of coca, not even through electoral
success, they should continue working with the self-defense units ‘that would be the core of our future
guerrilla movement’ (F. Escóbar, 2008: 202).  Only after the huge success of the 1997 elections that
brought Evo to Parliament as a deputy did the guerrilla tendencies start to lose ground and the electoral
road  begin  to  gain  more  and  more  supporters  (Stefanoni,2010:  147). The  battle  for  ideological
hegemony within the Six Federations had been won. Eventually, the preferred political strategy of the
cocaleros of the Six Federations would lead them to the government seat, the Burnt Palace as they call
in Bolivia the Government Palace because it was burnt almost to the ground during a 1875 uprising;
however, that process is beyond the scope of this paperwhich focuses on the mechanisms through which
they chose their political strategy and not on its subsequent execution. For a detailed analysis of that
process see Oikonomakis and Espinoza (2014), and Gutiérrez Aguilar, (2008).
Conclusion 
In the case of the Six Federation of the Tropic of Cochabamba and their  choice of political
strategies, two questions can be raised:
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1) How and through what mechanisms did they initially choose what political strategy to follow when
they first arrived in the region? 
2) When the time came for them to change political strategy, how and through what mechanisms did
they do so?
When the first  colonizadores moved to the Chapare, an unknown and inhospitable land, they had to
decide on how to deal with the new situation. It seems that necessity–given the absence of the Bolivian
state in the region–made them self-organise in a de facto autonomous manner, and opt for the sindicato
as the organisational form through which they would administer their daily social and political life. The
choice was not a random one. The  sindicato, unlike the party, already enjoyed a kind of ideological
hegemony among the Bolivian working class and was considered to be less corrupt and not–yet–an
instrument of the political ruling elite. In addition, after the Revolution of 1952 the state itself actively
promoted the formation of agricultural  sindicatos; this might have been an additional incentive for the
(neo)Chapareños who, at least at the beginning, hoped for some kind of governmental assistance in their
quest to colonise the Tropic. However, as this never happened, the sindicatos administered all social and
political affairs in the Chapare in a practically autonomous manner at least until 1988. To sum up, when
the Chapareños had to choose their political strategy, two mechanisms were set in motion: a) necessity,
and b) the activation of a historical and contemporary example, that of the sindicato, which they already
knew and believed in,  and which enjoyed some kind of ideological  hegemony among the Bolivian
working class.  After 1952, the fact that the state itself was promoting the creation of sindicatos all over
the country became an additional incentive, but not necessarily the principal one. 
Now, when it comes to the change of political strategy of the  cocaleros, it seems that things
played out in a similar fashion. First, there was necessity: previous conditions had changed, the relative
autonomy of the Six Federations in the Chapare had been violated by Law 1008 and by the arrival of the
police  and  military  forces  in  the  region,  and  the  Chapareños had  to  react.  The  first  reaction  was
‘institutional’ and ‘systemic’: protests and marches were met with violence and state repression. There
were  only  two  options  left  as  the  Chapareños perceived  it:  guerrilla  warfare and  elections  (or  a
combination of both). It seems that several leftist political forces in the country somehow got involved
with the Six Federations  and tried to  influence them politically  at  the  time–old trade unionists  and
people like Filemón Escóbar favoring the electoral route, several parties of the Left  in search of votes
(Healy,  1991)–while  apparently even the guerrilla  group EGTK (Ejercito  Guerrillero  Tupak Katari-
Tupak Katari Rebel Army) got involved in the formation of the first self-defense units. Therefore, there
was an ongoing battle for ideological hegemony within the Six Federations even before the introduction
of Law 1008, as Don Filemón Escóbar points out. The cocaleros themselves seem to have been favoring
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the via armada, not only since 1988, but even after their first electoral victories in the Chapare. It is not
clear how far  they were willing to go; what we do know is that the idea was certainly on the table.
However, they finally opted for electoral participation. It is assumed that the new electoral law granting
a bigger share of the budget and more responsibilities to the local authorities played a crucial role in the
final choice of the cocaleros. The chronological order of the events also points towards that direction.
However, under closer examination it seems that the decision to form a political instrument was already
being advocated within the cocalero movement long before the introduction of the Law . Therefore, this
author  argues that the LPP was an additional factor that might explain the timing of the execution of the
strategy, but not the mechanism behind its formation. What seems to be particularly important in the
process of the selection of political strategy by the cocaleros is their use of historical or contemporary
examples, national or international.  When opting for the  via armada, the cocaleros drew inspiration
from the Zapatistas or the Cuban Revolution for example, while those who favored the electoral route
were  inspired  by the  experience  of  the  Bloque  Parlamentario  Minero.  Of  course,  in  the  battle  for
ideological hegemony within the movement, the persuasion of the grass roots on the viability of one or
other historical  or contemporary  example  necessarily  involved  discrediting  the opponent’s  preferred
examples. The failed guerrilla experience of Che Guevarra in Bolivia was used in that direction.  In
addition, there was a long political preparation of the grass roots that took the form of intensive seminars
. 
The case of the Six Federations of the Tropic of Cochabamba and their choice (and change) of
political strategy seems to pose a challenge to the Political Opportunities Structure. While, according to
the theory, there was a lack of political opportunities in the Chapare and state repression was relatively
high, the  cocaleros did not opt for a guerrilla  war but  chose to take the electoral  path instead.  In
addition,  it  seems that  processes and mechanisms internal  to  the movement–and not external  to it–
played the most crucial role within the process of selection of its political strategy.  Therefore,   while
structural factors should by no means be ignored, more emphasis should be placed on mechanisms that
are internal to the movements when discussing the formation of their political strategies.The lessons we
draw from the cocalero experience is that the latter are not a quasi instinctive reaction to the opening up
or  closing of political opportunities, but  that a more complex, long-term, internal process  is involved
that should not be underestimated.  
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Figure 1: Main Towns in the Trópico of Cochabamba.
.
Source: Created on QGIS by the author
Table 1: Repression in the Chapare (1980-2004)
Source: Combined data extracted from Salazar Ortuño et al. (2008) 
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